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Do workers work more if wages are high? Evidence from a
randomized field experiment
Abstract
Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignificant substitution
effects. It is possible that these results are due to constraints on workers' labor supply choices. We
conducted a field experiment in a setting in which workers were free to choose hours worked and effort
per hour. We document a large positive elasticity of overall labor supply and an even larger elasticity of
hours, which implies that the elasticity of effort per hour is negative. We examine two candidate models
to explain these findings: a modified neoclassical model with preference spillovers across periods, and a
model with reference dependent, loss-averse preferences. With the help of a further experiment, we can
show that only loss-averse individuals exhibit a negative effort response to the wage increase.
Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a
Randomized Field Experiment
By ERNST FEHR AND LORENZ GOETTE*
Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignif-
icant substitution effects. It is possible that these results are due to constraints on
workers’ labor supply choices. We conducted a field experiment in a setting in which
workers were free to choose hours worked and effort per hour. We document a large
positive elasticity of overall labor supply and an even larger elasticity of hours,
which implies that the elasticity of effort per hour is negative. We examine two
candidate models to explain these findings: a modified neoclassical model with
preference spillovers across periods, and a model with reference dependent, loss-
averse preferences. With the help of a further experiment, we can show that only
loss-averse individuals exhibit a negative effort response to the wage increase. (JEL
J22, J31)
The intertemporal substitution of labor sup-
ply has far-reaching implications for the inter-
pretation of important phenomena. If, for
example, the intertemporal substitution of labor
supply is high, one may interpret the large vari-
ations in employment during business cycles as
voluntary choices by the workers rather than
involuntary layoffs. Intertemporal substitution
also plays a crucial role in the propagation of
shocks across periods (David Romer 1996;
Robert G. King and Sergio Rebelo 1999). Pre-
vious studies have found little evidence for in-
tertemporal substitution of labor. The estimated
elasticities are often small and statistically in-
significant, and sometimes even negative (see,
e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, Julio Rotemberg, and
Lawrence Summers 1985; John Pencavel 1986;
Joseph Altonji 1986; Richard Blundell 1994;
David Card 1994; Blundell and Thomas E. Ma-
Curdy 1999).1
The low estimates of intertemporal substitu-
tion are difficult to interpret, however, because
of serious limitations in the available data. The
life-cycle model of labor supply predicts inter-
temporal substitution with regard to transitory
wage changes or wage changes the workers
anticipate. Yet, the typical wage changes are
not transitory; hence, they are associated with
significant income effects. In addition, it seems
almost impossible to infer reliably from existing
data whether the workers anticipated the wage
change. Furthermore, serious endogeneity prob-
lems arise, as both supply and demand condi-
tions determine wages.2 Thus, the typically
available data require many auxiliary assump-
tions when testing the life-cycle model of labor
supply.
Another issue arises if labor markets are char-
acterized by a significant amount of job rationing
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This paper is part of the research priority program on the
foundations of human social behavior funded by the Uni-
versity of Zurich. The authors also acknowledge support
from the Swiss National Science Foundation under project
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we thank George Akerlof, Henry Farber, David Huffman,
Reto Jegen, Rafael Lalive, George Loewenstein, Jennifer
Lerner, Stephan Meier, Matthew Rabin, Jason Riis, Alois
Stutzer, Richard Thaler, and George Wu for their helpful
comments.
1 After reviewing a sizeable part of the literature, Card
(1994) concludes, for instance, that the “very small magni-
tude of the estimated intertemporal substitution elasticities”
can account for only a tiny fraction of the large person-
specific, year-to-year changes in labor supply.
2 Gerald Oettinger (1999) shows that if one neglects the
endogeneity of wage changes, estimates of labor supply
elasticities are severely downward-biased.
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or other constraints on workers’ labor supply. In
fact, there is strong evidence suggesting that
workers are not free to set their working hours
(John C. Ham 1982; Shulamit Kahn and Kevin
Lang 1991; William T. Dickens and Shelly
Lundberg 1993), rendering the identification of
the source of small intertemporal substitution
effects difficult, even if the problems mentioned
above could be solved. A small intertemporal
substitution effect could be due to these con-
straints, or it could be that the behavioral as-
sumptions behind the life-cycle model are
wrong. Indeed, Colin F. Camerer et al. (1997)
put forward the view that New York City cab
drivers’ daily labor supply is driven by non-
standard, reference dependent preferences that
exhibit loss aversion around a target income
level. This view has recently been called into
question by Henry S. Farber (2004, 2005).
In this paper, we use an ideal dataset to study
workers’ responses to transitory wage changes.
We conducted a randomized field experiment
at a bicycle messenger service in Zurich, Swit-
zerland. The bicycle messengers receive no
fixed-pay component and are paid solely on
commission. We have precise information for
all the workers on the number of shifts they
work and the revenues they generate per shift. A
shift always comprises five hours, and workers
in our sample worked at most one shift per day.
A key feature of our experiment is the imple-
mentation of an exogenous and transitory in-
crease of 25 percent in the commission rate.
Therefore, we can be sure that unobserved sup-
ply or demand variations did not induce the
change in the commission rate (i.e., the “wage”
change). Each participant in the experiment
knew ex ante the precise duration and size of the
wage increase. Since the wage was increased
only during four weeks, its impact on the work-
ers’ lifetime wealth is negligible.
In the firm under study, the messengers can
freely choose how many shifts (hours) they
work and how much effort they exert (to gen-
erate revenues). This means that our setting also
provides an ideal environment for studying the
behavioral foundations of labor supply. In our
context, the absence of intertemporal substitu-
tion effects cannot be attributed to institutional
constraints on labor supply. The exogenous
change in the commission rate raises the returns
from both the number of shifts and effort per
shift. In contrast to earlier studies (Oettinger
1999; Camerer et al. 1997; Yuan K. Chou
2002), we have the unique opportunity of study-
ing how hours and effort respond to the wage
increase and how overall labor supply (i.e., the
number of hours times the effort per hour) is
affected.
Our experimental results show that the wage
increase caused a large increase in overall labor
supply. Our estimate of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution with regard to overall labor
supply is between 1.12 and 1.25. This large
effect is exclusively driven by the increase in
the number of hours worked. In fact, the elas-
ticity of hours worked with regard to the wage
is higher than the elasticity of overall labor
supply. The elasticity of hours is between 1.34
and 1.50, considerably higher than that found in
previous studies. For example, Oettinger (1999)
investigates how stadium vendors adjust their
labor supply to changes in expected wages. He
uses a set of ex ante predictors of game atten-
dance, which are strongly related to the hourly
wages of stadium vendors. His estimated elas-
ticities range from 0.53 to 0.64.
The fact that the elasticity of hours (shifts)
worked is larger than the overall labor supply
elasticity suggests that the effort per hour de-
creased in response to the wage increase. And
indeed, a detailed analysis indicates that effort
per shift decreased by roughly 6 percent in
response to the wage increase, which implies a
wage elasticity of effort per shift of 0.24.
These results confirm the nonexperimental evi-
dence in previous studies of intertemporal labor
substitution based on samples where workers
were largely unconstrained in choosing hours
and effort. Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou
(2002) examined how cabdrivers, after having
decided to work on a given day, vary their daily
working time (which is a good proxy for daily
effort) in response to wage variations. Both
studies report that workers work fewer hours
(provide less effort) on high-wage days, indi-
cating a negative effort elasticity. Interpreting
this evidence is difficult, however, as pointed
out by Goette, David Huffman, and Fehr (2004)
and Farber (2004, 2005). One problem is that
the source of the variation in cabdrivers’ wages
is not completely clear. If, for example, there
are common supply-side shocks (e.g., most
drivers prefer not working on the Fourth of
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July), then the supply of cabdriver hours will be
small on these days and the ensuing wage will
be high. As a result, there will be a negative
correlation between wages and hours, although
all individuals have neoclassical time-separable
preferences. A second concern is a possible
selection effect: higher wages may induce cab-
drivers to work a few hours on days when they
otherwise would not have worked. Such an ef-
fect may generate a negative correlation be-
tween daily wages and daily hours, even though
all individuals behave exactly as the standard
model predicts. Our results, however, are im-
mune to both criticisms; that is, the reduction in
effort observed in our data questions the stan-
dard neoclassical model with time-separable
preferences. After all, the rise in the commis-
sion rate provides strong economic incentives
for working more hours and for working harder
during those hours.
We provide two reasonable extensions of the
standard model that can, in principle, explain a
negative effort elasticity. In the theory part of
our paper, we show that a neoclassical model, in
which last period’s effort raises this period’s
marginal disutility of effort, is consistent with
our evidence—workers who work in more pe-
riods may rationally decide to reduce effort per
period. We also show that a rational choice
model, with reference dependent preferences
exhibiting loss aversion around the reference
point (Goette, Huffman, and Fehr 2004), is also
able to explain the evidence. The intuition be-
hind this model is that workers with loss-averse
preferences have a daily reference income
level.3 Daily incomes below the reference level
are experienced as a “loss” and the marginal
utility of income is large in the loss domain. In
contrast, the marginal utility of income at and
above the reference level decreases discontinu-
ously to a lower level. Workers who tempo-
rarily earn higher wages are more likely to
exceed the reference income level, hence, re-
ducing their marginal utility of income and ul-
timately inducing them to provide less effort per
shift. At the same time, however, workers with
higher wages have a higher overall utility from
working a shift, so that they can more easily
cover the fixed costs of getting to work. Hence,
they are likely to work more shifts.
There are thus two competing theories which
are consistent with the facts. In order to discrim-
inate between the two theories, we conducted
another experiment based on the idea that loss
aversion is a personality trait which affects be-
havior across several domains (Daniel Kahne-
man and Amos Tversky 2000; Simon Gaechter,
Andreas Herrmann, and Eric Johnson 2005). In
this experiment, we measured the individual
worker’s loss aversion in lottery choices. We
then used these measures to examine whether
the negative response of effort per shift is due to
the existence of loss-averse workers. We indeed
find that the degree of a worker’s loss aversion
contributes significantly to the negative effort
elasticity. Moreover, it turns out that workers
who do not show loss aversion in the lottery
choices also do not have a significantly negative
elasticity. Only workers with loss aversion re-
duce effort per shift significantly when paid a
high wage.
Thus, the result of our second experiment
favors the model with reference dependent pref-
erences over the neoclassical model with “dis-
utility spillovers” across periods. Of course, the
evidence from the second experiment is not the
ultimate arbitrator, but it suggests that future
work should not disregard the loss aversion
model because it could contribute to a deeper
understanding of effort choices. At the same
time, we should also point out that one-third of
the workers in our sample did not exhibit loss
aversion and a negative effort elasticity. Thus,
future work should take the possibility of het-
erogeneous preferences more seriously. In ad-
dition, the results of our first experiment
unambiguously show that whatever behavioral
forces worked against the intertemporal substi-
tution of labor, they were apparently not capa-
ble of generating a negative elasticity of the
overall labor supply. The behavioral forces that
worked in favor of intertemporal substitution
outweighed any opposing forces.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. Section I describes the institutional en-
vironment and the details of the field experi-
ment. Section II discusses the implications of
different models of labor supply. Section III
reports the results from the field experiment.
3 Chip Heath, Richard Larrick, and George Wu (1999)
provide evidence that goals often serve the function of a
reference point.
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We first report the impact of the wage increase
on overall labor supply and then discuss how
shifts responded. Finally, we present the evi-
dence on how the wage increase affected the
effort per shift. This section also describes the
follow-up experiment and discusses the link
between individual loss aversion and workers’
effort responses. Section IV concludes the
paper.
I. Experimental Setup
Our study is based on the delivery records of
two Swiss messenger services, Veloblitz and
Flash Delivery Services (henceforth “Flash”),
which are located in Zurich. Each firm employs
between 50 and 60 bicycle messengers. The
available records contain information about
when a messenger worked a shift, all deliveries
he conducted during a shift, and the price of
each delivery. Thus, we know which messen-
gers worked a shift and how much revenue was
generated during the shift for each day in the
observation period. We first describe the orga-
nization of work at a bicycle messenger service
and then present our experiment in more detail.
A. Work at a Messenger Service
Unless pointed out below explicitly, the ar-
rangements are the same for the two messenger
services, Veloblitz and Flash. When a potential
worker applies for a job with one of the mes-
senger services, an experienced messenger eval-
uates him or her with respect to fitness,
knowledge of locations, names of streets, cour-
tesy, and skill handling the CB radio. Once
accepted as an employee, messengers can freely
choose how many five-hour shifts they will
work during a week. There are about 30 shifts
available at Veloblitz and about 22 at Flash on
each workday (Monday to Friday). In principle,
messengers could work more than one shift per
day, but none of them chose to do so during the
experiment or in the months prior to the exper-
iment. The shifts are displayed on a shift plan
for every calendar week at the messenger ser-
vice’s office. There are two types of shifts,
called “fixed” and “sign up.” A “sign-up” shift
simply means that a shift is vacant at a partic-
ular time. Any messenger can sign up to work
that shift (e.g., on Wednesday from 8 a.m. to
1 p.m.). If a messenger commits to a “fixed”
shift, he has to work that shift every week. For
example, if a messenger chooses Wednesday
from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. as a fixed shift, he will
have to fill that shift every Wednesday for at
least six months. Thus, fixed shifts represent a
commitment of several months and can be can-
celled only with at least four weeks notice.
Roughly two-thirds of the shifts are fixed. It is
also important to note that the number and the
allocation of fixed shifts across messengers re-
mained the same during the entire experiment.
The company refused to change the fixed shifts
just because of the experiment. All shifts that
are not fixed are available to any messenger. All
workers participating in our study worked both
fixed and variable shifts.
Two further items are worth mentioning. First,
there is no minimum number of shifts that the
messengers have to work at either messenger
service. Second, both messenger services found
filling the available shifts difficult. There is al-
most always at least one unfilled shift and, on
average, almost three shifts per day remain un-
filled. For example, during the period before the
experiment, from September 1999 to August
2000, approximately 60 shifts remained unfilled
every month. This implies that messengers are
unlikely to be rationed in the choice of shifts.
Messengers receive no fixed wage. Their
earnings are given solely as a fixed percentage w
of their daily revenues. Hence, if a messenger
carries out deliveries that generate revenues r
during his shift, his earnings on that day will be
wr. An important feature of the work environ-
ment concerns the fact that messengers have
substantial discretion about how much effort to
provide during a shift. They stay in contact with
the dispatcher at the messenger service office
only through CB radio. In order to assign a
delivery, say, from location A to location B, the
dispatcher will contact the messenger whom he
thinks is closest to A to pick up the delivery. All
messengers can listen in on the radio. If they
believe that they are closer to A than the mes-
senger originally contacted, they can get back to
the dispatcher and say so and will then be as-
signed that delivery. Conversely, if the messen-
ger does not want to carry out the delivery from
location A to location B, he may not respond to
the call. Messengers have, therefore, several
means of increasing the number of deliveries
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they complete. They can ride at higher speed,
follow the radio more actively, or find the short-
est possible way to carry out a delivery.
Thus, work at a bicycle messenger service
closely approximates a model where individuals
are unconstrained in choosing how many shifts
(hours) to work and how hard to work (i.e., how
many deliveries to complete during a shift).
B. The Experimental Design
In order to evaluate the labor supply effect of
a temporary wage increase, we randomly as-
signed those Veloblitz messengers who were
willing to participate in the experiment to a
treatment and a control group, and we imple-
mented a fully anticipated temporary increase in
the commission rate by roughly 25 percent for
the treatment group. The commission rate for
men in the treatment group was temporarily
increased from w  0.39 to w  0.49 and the
rate for women was temporarily increased from
w  0.44 to w  0.54. The additional earnings
for the messengers were financed by the Swiss
National Science Foundation.
In order to participate in the experiment, all
messengers had to complete a questionnaire at
the beginning and end of each experimental
period. The messengers were informed that a
failure to complete all questionnaires meant
they would not receive the additional earnings
from the experiment. All messengers who fin-
ished the first questionnaire also filled in the
remaining questionnaires.4 Thus, the group of
messengers who participated in the experiment
was constant during the entire experiment, i.e.,
there was no attrition. Randomization into a
treatment and a control group was achieved by
randomly allocating the participating messen-
gers into a group A and a group B. The ran-
domization was based on the administrative
codes that the messenger service uses to identify
a messenger in its accounting system. All mes-
sengers at Veloblitz were assigned a number
depending on the date when they started work-
ing for the company. The first messenger who
worked at Veloblitz was assigned the number 1,
the second 2, and so forth. The participating
messengers with odd numbers were assigned to
group A and participating messengers with even
numbers to group B.
The messengers did not know that the pur-
pose of the experiment was the study of labor
supply behavior, nor did they realize that we
received the full (anonymous) records of each
messenger containing the number of shifts and
the number of deliveries completed. If pressed,
we told the participants that we wanted to study
the relation between wages and job satisfaction.
The purpose of our study was credible because
the questionnaires contained several questions
related to job satisfaction.5
For group A, we implemented a 25-percent
increase in the commission rate during the four
weeks in September 2000. The messengers in
group B were paid their normal commission rate
during this time period so that they could be
used as a control group. In contrast, only the
individuals in group B received a 25-percent
increase in the commission rate during the four
weeks in November 2000, while the members
of group A received their normal commission
rate and therefore served as a control group.
Thus, a key feature of our experiment is that
there were two experimental periods that lasted
for four weeks and both group A and group B
served as a treatment and a control group in one
of the two experimental periods. This feature, in
combination with our participation rule, implies
that our design is perfectly balanced during the
two treatment periods. Therefore, the point es-
timate of the treatment effect is completely in-
dependent of individual heterogeneity between
our subjects. We will include messenger fixed
effects in most of the analysis, however, to
reduce the estimated standard errors.
4 The messengers at Veloblitz who did not participate in
the experiment were almost exclusively workers who were
already quite detached from the company or who were on
probationary shifts. The “detached” workers typically
worked roughly one shift per week during the experiment
and the months prior to the experiment.
5 These features of the experiment ensure that our results
cannot be affected by the Hawthorne effect. The Hawthorne
effect means that subjects behave differently just because
they know that the experimenters observe their behavior.
Yet, our subjects did not know that we could observe their
behavior during the wage increase. Moreover, since both the
treatment group and the control group are part of the overall
experiment, and since our key results rely on the compari-
son between these groups, we control for a potential Haw-
thorne effect.
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Our experiment thus enables us to provide a
very clean isolation of the impact of the tempo-
rary wage increase. If, for example, the imple-
mented wage change increases labor supply, we
should observe this increase both in the first and
the second experimental period. In the first ex-
perimental period, the members of group A
(who receive the higher wage in this period)
should exhibit a larger labor supply than the
members of group B, while the reverse should
be true in the second experimental period—
members of group B (who receive the higher
wage in this period) should supply more labor.
Our experimental design also enables us to
control for the income effect of the wage in-
crease, i.e., we can identify the pure substitution
effect for the participating messengers. We an-
nounced the experiment in the last week of
August 2000 and all additional earnings from
the experiment—regardless of whether subjects
were members of group A or group B—were
paid out after the end of the second experimen-
tal period in December 2000.6 Thus, the budget
constraint for both groups of participating mes-
sengers was affected in the same way. Due to
the randomization of the participating messen-
gers into groups A and B, the income effect
cancels out if we identify the treatment effect by
comparing the labor supply of the control and
treatment groups.
As demand for delivery services varies from
day to day and from month to month, it is useful
to control for time effects. The available infor-
mation about Flash enables us to identify pos-
sible time effects across treatment periods
because both Veloblitz and Flash operate in the
same market. There is a strong correlation be-
tween the total daily revenues at Veloblitz and
Flash. When we compute the raw correlation
between total revenues at the two firms over the
two experimental periods plus the four weeks
prior to the experiment, we find a correlation of
0.56 (Breusch-Pagan 2(1)  18.93, p  0.01,
N  60 days). Even after removing daily effects
from both series, the correlation is still 0.46
(Breusch-Pagan 2(1)  13.16, p  0.01, N 
60 days). This shows that the revenues at the
two firms are highly correlated, even over such
a short time horizon.7
We believe that our experiment represents a
useful innovation to the existing literature for
several reasons. First, it implements a fully an-
ticipated, temporary, and exogenous variation
in the (output-based) wage rates of the messen-
gers, which is key for studying the intertempo-
ral substitution of labor. The experimental wage
increase was large and provides a clear incen-
tive for increasing labor supply. Moreover, the
participating messengers are experienced, and
daily fluctuations in their earnings are common.
Hence, we experimentally implement a wage
change in an otherwise familiar environment.
Second, the data we obtained from Veloblitz
allow us to study two dimensions of labor sup-
ply: hours as measured by the number of shifts,
and effort as measured by the revenues gener-
ated per shift or the number of deliveries per
shift. No other study that we are aware of can
look at these two dimensions simultaneously.
Third, we can combine the dataset with the full
records from a second messenger service oper-
ating in the same market. This will prove useful
for investigating any effect that the experiment
might have had on the nonparticipating messen-
gers at Veloblitz, and helps to control for de-
mand variations over time.
II. Predictions
In this subsection, we derive predictions about
labor supply behavior in our experiment. We
use two types of models: neoclassical models
and a model of reference dependent utility with
loss-averse workers. In view of our results, we
are particularly interested in the question of
which kind of model is capable of predicting an
increase in shifts (hours) worked and a decrease
in effort per shift.
6 In the time period between the announcement of the
experiment and the beginning of the first treatment period,
no new regular workers arrived at Veloblitz. Only workers
who worked on probationary shifts arrived during this time
period, and they were not allowed to participate in the
experiment because they often leave the firm after a short
time and lack the necessary skills. Including them in the
experiment would have created the risk of attrition bias.
7 If we add the eight months prior to the experiment, we
find a correlation of about 0.75. To check the robustness of
our results, we also include—in some of our regressions—
the nonparticipating messengers at Veloblitz in the nonex-
perimental comparison group that is used to identify time
effects.
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A. Neoclassical Model with Time-Separable
Utility
In this subsection, we integrate the institu-
tional setting at our messenger service into a
canonical model of intertemporal utility maxi-
mization with time-separable utility. We define
the relevant time period to be one day. Consider
an individual who maximizes lifetime utility
(1) Uo  
t 0
T
tuct , et , xt ,
where   1 denotes the discount factor, u( )
represents the one-period utility function, ct de-
notes consumption, et is effort in period t, and xt
denotes a variable that affects the preference for
working on particular days. For example, a stu-
dent who works a few shifts per week at
Veloblitz may have higher opportunity costs for
working on Fridays because he attends impor-
tant lectures on Fridays. The utility function
obeys uc  0, ue  0 and is strictly concave in
ct and et. The lifetime budget constraint for the
individual is given by
(2) 
t 0
T
pˆt ct 1  rt
 
t 0
T
wˆt et  yt 1  rt,
where pˆt denotes the price of the consumption
good, wˆt the period, t wage per unit of et, and yt
nonlabor income. For convenience we assume
that the interest rate r is constant and there is no
uncertainty regarding the time path of prices
and wages. The sign of the comparative static
predictions is not affected by these simplifying
assumptions.
In an Appendix available online,8 we show that
along the optimal path, the within-period deci-
sions of a rational individual maximizing a time-
separable concave utility function like (1), subject
to constraint (2), can be equivalently represented
in terms of the maximization of a static one-period
utility function that is linear in income.9 This static
utility function can be written as
(3) vet , xt   wt et  get , xt ,
where g(et, xt) is strictly convex in et, and mea-
sures the discounted disutility of effort, xt captures
exogenous shifts in the disutility of effort,  mea-
sures the marginal utility of life-time wealth, and
wt represents the discounted wage in period t.
Thus, wtet can be interpreted as the discounted
utility of income arising from effort in period t.10
Workers who choose effort according to (3)
respond to an anticipated temporary increase in
wt with a higher effort et. A rise in wt increases
the marginal utility returns of effort, wt, which
increases the effort level e*t that maximizes v (et,
xt). The situation is a bit more complicated in
our experiment, however, because the messen-
gers can choose the number of shifts and the
effort during the shift. Theoretically, the exis-
tence of shifts can be captured by the existence
of a minimal effort level e˜ that has to be met by
the worker or by the existence of fixed costs of
working a shift. Intuitively, if there is a fixed
cost of working a shift, an employee will work
on a given day only if the utility of e*t, v (e*t, xt)
is higher than the utility of not going to work at
8 The Appendix is available at www.e-aer.org/data/
mar07/20020849_data.zip.
9 Our characterization is inspired by the results in Martin
Browning, Angus Deaton, and Margaret Irish (1985) who
show that the within-period decisions can be characterized
in terms of the maximization of a static profit function.
10  is constant along the optimal path of ct and et. This
has the important consequence that an anticipated tempo-
rary wage variation does not affect the marginal utility of
lifetime wealth. Thus, anticipated temporary variations in
wages (or prices) have no income effects. Yet, if there is a
nonanticipated temporary increase in the wage,  changes
immediately after the new information about the wage in-
crease becomes available, and remains constant at this
changed level afterward. For our experiment, this means
that the income effect stemming from the temporary wage
increase has to occur immediately after the announcement
of the experiment in August 2000. Thereafter, the marginal
utility of lifetime wealth again remains constant so that
there are no further changes in  during the experiment. The
difference in behavior between the treatment group and the
control group during the two treatments can thus not be due
to changes in . Note also that (3) not only describes the
optimal effort choice in period t, but also is based on the
optimal consumption decision in period t. For any change in
effort, the consumption decision also changes in an optimal
manner (see Appendix).
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all. As a wage increase raises v(e*t, xt), workers
are more likely to work on a given day, i.e., the
number of shifts worked will increase.11
B. Neoclassical Model with Nonseparable
Utility
The prediction of the previous subsection is,
however, not robust to the introduction of non-
separable utility functions. To illustrate this,
consider a simple example where
(4) vet , et 1   et w  get 1  et 1 .
This example captures the intuition that if a
worker worked yesterday, he has higher mar-
ginal cost of effort today. We assume, for sim-
plicity, that e0  0, that there are only two
further time periods (period 1 and period 2), and
that the wage is constant across time. If we
ignore discounting, the two-period utility is
given by U  v (e1, 0)  v (e2, e1). Therefore, if
the wage is high enough to induce the worker to
go to work in both periods, the worker chooses
effort e*1*and e*2*according to
(5) w  ge1   e2 ge2 1  e1 ;
(6) w  ge2 1  e1 1  e1 .
If work is supplied in both periods, an increase
in e1 causes a higher disutility of labor in period
2, which lowers e2. Of course, rational workers
take this effect into account when they decide
on e1, which means that the overall marginal
disutility of e1 is higher if e2 is positive com-
pared to when it is zero. In particular, if wages
are low enough so that it is no longer worth-
while to work in period 2 (e2  0), the first-
order conditions are given by
(5) w  ge1 ;
(6) w  g01  e1 .
A comparison of conditions (5) and (6) with
conditions (5) and (6) shows that it is possible
that the optimal effort e1 according to (5) is
higher than e*1*and e*2*. In the online Appendix,
we provide an explicit example that proves this
point. This possibility arises because the mar-
ginal disutility of working in each of the two
periods, which is indicated by the right-hand
side of (5) and (6), is higher than the marginal
disutility of working only in period 1, which is
given by g(e1). In the context of our experi-
ment, this means that messengers who work
more shifts when the wage is high may ratio-
nally decide to reduce the effort per shift.
The simple model above does not predict that
workers who work more shifts (days) will nec-
essarily reduce their effort per shift. It allows
for only this possibility. If the wage increase is
large enough, it is also possible that workers
who behave according to this model raise their
effort per shift. There is, however, one predic-
tion that follows unambiguously from a neo-
classical approach regardless of whether utility
is time separable or not. Browning, Deaton, and
Irish (1985) have shown that a general neoclas-
sical model predicts that overall labor supply,
¥ et, increases in high-wage periods in response
to a temporary increase in wages. Applied to
our context, this means that during the four-
week period where the wage is higher for the
treatment group, the total revenue (or the total
number of deliveries) of the treatment group
should exceed the total revenue (or the total
number of deliveries) of the control group.
C. Reference Dependent Utility
Another potential explanation for why ef-
fort per shift might decrease in response to a
temporary wage increase is that individuals
could have preferences that include a daily
income target y˜ that serves as a reference
point. The crucial element in this approach is
that if a person falls short of his or her target,
he or she is assumed to experience an addi-
tional psychological cost, which is not present
if income varies above the reference point.
This explanation is suggested by the large
number of studies indicating reference depen-
dent behavior (for a selection of papers on
this see Kahneman and Tversky 2000). Evi-
dence from psychology (Heath, Larrick, and
Wu 1999) suggests that the marginal utility of
a dollar below the target is strictly higher than
11 More formally, the wage increase raises the utility of
going to work for all x. Hence, the participation condition
will be met for more states x.
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the marginal utility of a dollar above the
target.12 A daily income target seems plausi-
ble for bike messengers in our sample because
their daily incomes are a salient feature of
their work environment. The messengers keep
receipts from each delivery made on a shift.
This makes them acutely aware of how much
money they earn from each completed deliv-
ery. The messengers also turn in the receipts
at the end of the shift, making it difficult for
them to keep track of how much money they
earned over several shifts. A daily income
target may also serve the messengers as a
commitment device for the provision of effort
during the shift. Zurich is rather hilly and
riding up the hills several times during a shift
requires quite some effort—in particular if the
weather is bad or toward the end of a shift. A
daily income target may thus help the mes-
sengers overcome a natural tendency to
“shirk” that arises from a high marginal dis-
utility of effort.
As in Goette, Huffman, and Fehr (2004), we
capture the existence of reference dependent
behavior by the following one-period utility
function:
(7) vet 
 (wtet  y˜) g(et , xt) if wtet 	 y˜
(wtet  y˜) g(et , xt) if wtet  y˜ ,
where 
  1 measures the degree of loss aver-
sion, i.e., the increase in the marginal utility of
income if the individual is below the income
target. Previous evidence (see Kahneman and
Tversky 2000) suggests that 
 	 2 for many
individuals. Loss aversion at this level creates
powerful incentives to exert more effort below
the income target. Once individuals attain the
target y˜, however, the marginal utility of income
drops discretely (from 
 to ), causing a sub-
stantial reduction in the incentive to supply
effort.
The preferences described in (7) imply that
workers increase the number of shifts when they
are temporarily paid a higher wage: a rise in
wages increases the utility of working on a
given day. Thus, at higher wages it is more
likely that the utility of working v (et) exceeds
the fixed costs of working. At the same time,
however, the increase in wages makes it more
likely that the income target is already met or
exceeded at relatively low levels of effort.
Therefore, compared to the control group, the
workers in the treatment group are more likely
to face a situation where the marginal utility of
income is  instead of 
, i.e., they face lower
incentives to work during the shift.13 As a con-
sequence, members of the treatment group will
provide less effort than members of the control
group.
The previous discussion shows that reference
dependent preferences and a neoclassical model
with nonseparable preferences may make simi-
lar predictions. In particular, both models are
consistent with a reduction in effort per shift
during the wage increase. The reduction in ef-
fort in the income target model, however,
should be related to the degree of loss aversion

, as explained above. Evidence suggests that
there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree
of loss aversion between individuals, and that
individuals who are loss averse in one type of
decisions are also loss averse in other domains
of life (see Gaechter, Herrmann, and Johnson
2005). Thus, in principle, the two explanations
can be distinguished if one obtains an individual
level measure of 
.
12 See Goette and Huffman (2005) for survey evidence
on this point. They present bike messengers with direct
survey scenarios to elicit whether messengers care more
about making money in the afternoon if they had good luck
in the morning than after a bad morning. In their scenarios,
good luck means that messengers had the opportunity to
make particularly profitable deliveries in the morning. For
example, good luck means that a delivery just crosses an
additional district boundary; such deliveries command a
substantially higher price without much additional effort.
About 70 percent of the messengers respond in a fashion
consistent with daily income targeting.
13 If 
 is sufficiently high relative to the wage increase,
one may obtain the extreme result that the worker provides
effort to obtain exactly y˜ before and after the increase. In
this case, the worker’s effort obviously decreases in re-
sponse to the wage increase because at higher wages y˜ is
obtained at lower effort levels. In general, the larger is 
, the
sharper the kink in the objective function and the more
likely the worker’s optimal effort choice e* will be at the
kink, i.e., the more likely 
wˆt  g(e*)  wˆt holds. Note,
however, that even if the worker is not a “perfect” income
targeter, i.e., even if before or after the wage increase he
does not earn exactly y˜, negative effort responses may
occur.
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III. Results
This section reports the results from our field
experiment. Our analysis is based on the four
weeks prior to the first experimental period and
the two subsequent experimental periods in
which first group A and then group B received
a wage increase. The data contain the day of
each delivery, the messenger’s identification
number, and the price for each delivery. Thus,
we have, in principle, two measures of labor
supply: the amount of revenue generated and
the number of deliveries completed. Since
longer deliveries command a higher price and
require more effort, the revenue is our preferred
measure of labor supply. Our estimates of the
treatment effect, however, are almost identical
for either choice of the labor supply measure.
A. The Impact of the Wage Increase on Total
Revenue per Messenger
The first important question is whether there
is a treatment effect on total revenue per mes-
senger during the first and second experimental
periods. Tables 1 and 2 present the relevant
data. The tables show the revenue data for
groups A and B, and the messengers at Flash
and Veloblitz who did not participate in the
experiment. Table 1 shows the “raw” revenue
per messenger—uncontrolled for individual
fixed effects. Table 2 controls for individual
fixed effects by showing how, on average, the
messengers’ revenues deviate from their per-
son-specific mean revenues. Thus, a positive
number here indicates a positive deviation from
the person-specific mean; a negative number
indicates a negative deviation.
Tables 1 and 2 show that group A and group
B generate very similar revenues per messenger
during the four weeks prior to the experiment. If
we control for individual fixed effects, we find
that the revenues per messenger are almost
identical across groups and close to zero. For
example, the difference in revenues between
group A and group B is only CHF 71.03 if we
control for person-specific effects with a stan-
dard error of CHF 475.37 (see Table 2). This
difference is negligible compared to the average
revenue of roughly CHF 3,400 that was gener-
ated by a messenger during the preexperimental
period. Thus, in the absence of an experimental
treatment, the messengers in group A and group
B behave in the same way.
During the first experimental period (hence-
forth, “treatment period 1”), however, in which
group A received the higher wage, the total
revenue generated by group A is much larger
than the revenue of group B, indicating a large
treatment effect. On average during this period,
TABLE 1—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Participating messengers Difference
groups
A and B
Nonparticipating
messengers,
Veloblitz
Messengers,
FlashGroup A Group B
Four-week period
prior to
experiment
Mean revenues 3,500.67 3,269.94 241.67 1461.70 1637.49
(2,703.25) (2,330.41) [563.19] (1,231.95) (1,838.61)
Mean shifts 12.14 10.95 1.20 5.19 6.76
(8.06) (7.58) [1.75] (4.45) (6.11)
N 21 19 21 59
Treatment period 1 Mean revenues 4,131.33 3,005.75 1,125.59 844.21 1,408.23
(2,669.21) (2,054.20) [519.72] (1,189.53) (1,664.39)
Mean shifts 14.00 9.85 4.15 3.14 6.32
(7.25) (6.76) [1.53] (4.63) (6.21)
N 22 20 21 65
Treatment period 2 Mean revenues 2,734.03 3,675.57 941.53 851.23 921.58
(2,571.58) (2,109.19) [513.2] (1,150.31) (1,076.47)
Mean shifts 8.73 12.55 3.82 3.29 4.46
(7.61) (7.49) [1.65] (4.15) (4.74)
N 22 20 24 72
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses, standard error of differences in brackets. Group A received the high commission
rate in experimental period 1, group B in experimental period 2.
Source: Own calculations.
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messengers in group A generated roughly CHF
4,131 while messengers in group B generated
revenues of only CHF 3,006 (see Table 1). This
pattern is reversed in the second treatment pe-
riod, when group B gets the higher wage; group
B generates revenues per messenger of CHF
3,676 while group A produces revenues of only
CHF 2,734. If we control for individual fixed
effects (see Table 2), we can see that the stan-
dard errors are relatively small, suggesting that
the differences across groups are significant. It
is also reassuring that the point estimates of the
effects in the two treatment periods are almost
identical, pointing to a stable behavioral re-
sponse to the wage increase.
We perform a statistical test of the effect of
the wage increase on revenues in regressions
(1)–(3) of Table 3. All regressions are of the
form
(8) rit  i  Tit  dt  eit ,
where rit measures the revenue generated by
messenger i during a four-week period t, i is a
fixed effect for messenger i, Tit is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if the messenger is on
the increased commission rate, dt is a time
dummy estimated for treatment period 1 and for
treatment period 2, and eit is the error term.
Regression (1) is based only on the data of
groups A and B at Veloblitz. Due to the random
assignment of the participating messengers
across groups, and due to the fact that both
groups served once as a control and once as a
treatment group, this regression allows for a
clean isolation of the treatment effect. The re-
gression indicates that the treatment effect is
highly significant and that the messengers on a
high wage generate roughly CHF 1,000 addi-
tional revenue compared to the experimental
control group.
The two other regressions show that the mea-
sured impact of the experimental wage increase
on the treated group remains almost the same if
we include in the comparison group messengers
of Flash and nonparticipants of Veloblitz. Re-
gression (2) compares the treatment group at
Veloblitz with all other messengers at Veloblitz
and finds again a large and significant treatment
effect of roughly CHF 1,000. Regression (3)
uses observations from all messengers at
Veloblitz and the messengers at Flash. The in-
clusion of the messengers at Flash is suggested
by the strong correlation in revenues between
Flash and Veloblitz. Regression (3) also in-
cludes a dummy for the whole nontreated group
at Veloblitz, i.e., the messengers in the control
group and those who did not participate in the
TABLE 2—REVENUES PER FOUR-WEEK PERIOD
(Average deviations from individual means)
Participating
messengers
Nonparticipating
messengers,
Veloblitz
Messengers,
Flash
Group
A
Group
B
Four-week period
prior to
experiment
Mean revenues 48.88 119.91 456.72 305.08
(366.61) (302.61) (179.92) (131.42)
Difference:
group A–group B
71.03
(475.37)
Treatment period 1 Mean revenues 721.98 277.95 160.77 102.85
(192.90) (240.62) (173.89) (105.76)
Difference:
group A–group B
999.93
(308.40)
Treatment period 2 Mean revenues 675.32 391.87 258.95 342.84
(288.62) (250.55) (137.61) (129.50)
Difference:
group B–group A
1,067.19
(382.20)
Notes: Standard error of the means in parentheses. Same number of observations as in Table 1. Group A received the high
commission rate in experimental period 1, group B in experimental period 2.
Source: Own calculations.
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experiment. Therefore, this dummy measures
whether the nontreated group at Veloblitz be-
haved differently relative to the messengers at
Flash, and the treatment dummy measures
whether the treated group at Veloblitz behaved
differently relative to the messengers at Flash.
In this regression, the coefficient of the treat-
ment dummy indicates a treatment effect of
roughly CHF 1,000. In addition, the dummy for
the whole nontreated group at Veloblitz is small
and insignificant, indicating that the nontreated
group was not affected by the wage increase for
the treated group. This result suggests that the
wage increase for the treated group did not
constrain the opportunities for working for the
nontreated group at Veloblitz. The result is also
consistent with the permanent existence of un-
filled shifts and with survey evidence. The over-
whelming majority of the messengers stated
that they could work the number of shifts they
wanted to work.14
In summary, the results above indicate a large
and highly significant effect of a temporary
wage increase on the total effort of the treated
group. In contrast to many previous studies, our
results imply a large intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. We have seen that the treatment
effect is roughly CHF 1,000. The average rev-
enue across group A and group B is CHF 3,568
in treatment period 1; in treatment period 2 it is
3,205. Thus, the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is between (1,000/3,568)/0.25  1.12
and (1,000/3,205)/0.25  1.25, which is sub-
stantially larger compared to what previous
studies have found (see, e.g., Oettinger 1999).15
14 It is also noteworthy that we find a negative effect of
time on revenues per messenger in all three regressions. The
time effect is never significant for the first treatment period,
but it is higher for the second treatment period and reaches
significance at the 5-percent level in some of the regres-
sions. These time effects suggest that a comparison of the
revenues of the same group over time is problematic be-
cause revenue is likely to be “polluted” by monthly varia-
tions in demand. It is thus not possible to identify the
treatment effect by comparing how a group behaved in
treatment period 1 relative to treatment period 2.
15 It is even possible that our measure of the elasticity of
labor supply with regard to a temporary wage increase
underestimates the true elasticity because we use revenues
per messenger as a proxy for labor supply per messenger. If
wages w affect effort e and effort affects revenue r, the
elasticity of e with respect to w, which we denote by ew, is
given by rw/re, where rw is the elasticity of r with respect
TABLE 3—MAIN EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
(OLS regressions)
Dependent variable:
Revenues per four-week period
Dependent variable:
Shifts per four-week period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations are
restricted to
Messengers
participating in
experiment
All
messengers at
Veloblitz
All
messengers at
Flash and
Veloblitz
Messengers
participating in
experiment
All
messengers at
Veloblitz
All
messengers at
Flash and
Veloblitz
Treatment dummy 1,033.6*** 1,094.5*** 1,035.8** 3.99*** 4.08*** 3.44**
(326.9) (297.8) (444.7) (1.030) (0.942) (1.610)
Dummy for nontreated
at Veloblitz
54.4 0.772
(407.4) (1.520)
Treatment period 1 211 370.6 264.8 1.28 1.57 0.74
(497.3) (334.1) (239.9) (1.720) (1.210) (0.996)
Treatment period 2 574.7 656.2 650.5** 2.56 2.63** 2.19**
(545.7) (357.9) (284.9) (1.860) (1.260) (1.090)
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.74 0.786 0.753 0.694 0.74 0.695
N 124 190 386 124 190 386
Note: Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on messengers, are in parentheses.
*** Indicates significance at the 1-percent level.
** Indicates significance at the 5-percent level.
* Indicates significance at the 10-percent level.
Source: Own calculations.
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Another common way to calculate this elas-
ticity is to estimate equation (8) in logarithms.
Some participants of the experiment, how-
ever, did not work at all during the control
period and therefore have zero revenues in
this four-week period. Hence, taking the log-
arithm means that these observations have to
be removed from the sample. Strictly speaking,
then, we would no longer have an experimental
comparison.
B. The Impact of the Wage Increase on Shifts
Worked
After we documented the strong impact of the
wage increase on total labor supply, the natural
question is whether both the number of shifts
and the effort per shift increased. In this section,
we examine the impact of the wage increase on
the number of shifts worked, while in the next
section we take a closer look at effort per shift.
Tables 1 and 4 provide a first indication of
how the wage increase affected shifts. Table
1 shows the absolute number of shifts per
worker in group A and group B during the
four-week period prior to the experiment and
the two treatment periods. Table 4 controls
for person-specific effects by showing the av-
erage deviation of the number of shifts from
the person specific means.
Table 1 shows that in the preexperimental
period group A worked roughly 12 shifts and
group B worked roughly 11 shifts. The standard
errors are considerable due to large differences
between the workers. If we control for messenger-
specific effects (Table 4), we find that the average
deviation from person-specific means is very
small in both groups and close to zero during
the preexperimental period. The deviation from
person-specific means is 0.22 in group A (with
a standard error of 1.29), and 0.35 in group B
(with a standard error of 0.98). Thus, there are
almost no differences in shifts across groups
before the experiment.
During the first treatment period, however,
the messengers in group A, who are paid the
high wage, worked almost four shifts more than
the messengers in group B (Table 1). Likewise,
in the second treatment period the messengers
in group B, who now receive the high wage,
work four more shifts than the messengers in
to w (which is observable to us) and re is the elasticity of
r with respect to e (which is not observable to us). Thus, our
measure rw implicitly assumes that the elasticity re is
equal to one. If re is less than one, our measure even
underestimates the true labor supply elasticity. re is less
than one if the production function r  f(e) is strictly
concave and f(0)  0 holds.
TABLE 4—SHIFTS PER FOUR-WEEK PERIOD
(Average deviations from individual means)
Participating messengers Nonparticipating
messengers,
Veloblitz
Messengers,
FlashGroup A Group B
Four-week period
prior to
experiment
Mean shifts 0.22 0.35 1.57 0.98
(1.29) (0.98) (0.75) (0.53)
Difference:
group A–group B
0.57
(1.62)
Treatment period 1 Mean shifts 2.53 1.18 0.48 0.52
(0.65) (0.79) (0.75) (0.42)
Difference:
group A–group B
3.71
(1.02)
Treatment period 2 Mean shifts 2.74 1.52 0.96 1.27
(0.98) (0.77) (0.57) (0.45)
Difference:
group B–group A
4.26
(1.24)
Notes: Standard error of the means in parentheses. Same number of observations as in Table 1. Group A received the high
commission rate in experimental period 1, group B in experimental period 2.
Source: Own calculations.
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group B. Moreover, if we control for messen-
ger-specific effects (see Table 4), the standard
errors become very small, suggesting that the
differences across groups are significant.
A statistical test is presented in regressions
(4) through (6) in Table 3. The independent
variable in these regressions is sit, the number of
shifts that messenger i worked during the four-
week period t. The right-hand side of these
regressions is the same as in equation (8), i.e.,
we included a treatment dummy, individual
fixed effects, and time dummies for treatment
periods 1 and 2. Regression (4) estimates the
impact of the treatment by using only data from
group A and group B. It shows a large and
highly significant treatment effect; the treated
group works on average four shifts more than
the control group. Regression (5) uses data from
all messengers at Veloblitz. The treatment
dummy thus compares the treated with the
whole group of untreated messengers at
Veloblitz. This regression basically replicates
the results of regression (4). In regression (6),
we use data from all messengers at Veloblitz
and at Flash. In addition, we include a dummy
variable that takes on a value of one if a mes-
senger belongs to the whole nontreated group at
Veloblitz (which comprises the experimental
control group and the messengers who did not
participate in the experiment). As in regression
(3), this dummy measures whether the experi-
ment had an effect on the whole nontreated
group at Veloblitz by comparing this group with
Flash messengers. The point estimate on this
dummy is small and insignificant, suggesting
that the experiment had no effect on the non-
treated group at Veloblitz. The treatment
dummy in regression (6) compares the treated
group with the Flash messengers and again in-
dicates a significant treatment effect of similar
size as in the previous regressions.
In summary, regressions (4)–(6) in Table
3 indicate a clear positive treatment effect of the
wage increase on shifts. On average, workers
supplied about four shifts more if they receive a
high commission rate. Since the average num-
ber of shifts worked during the two treatment
periods is 11.925 and 10.64, respectively, the
wage elasticity of shifts is between (4/11.925)/
0.25  1.34 and (4/10.64)/0.25  1.50. Thus,
the shift choices are even more responsive to the
wage increase than total revenue per messenger.
By definition, the wage elasticity of total reve-
nue is equal to the elasticity of shifts plus the
elasticity of the revenue per shift. Therefore, the
higher wage elasticity of shifts compared to the
elasticity of total revenues is a first indication
that the elasticity of effort per shift is negative.
C. The Impact of the Wage Increase on Effort
per Shift
When examining the revenue per shift, it is
useful to restrict attention to behavior during
fixed shifts. Recall that the management at
Veloblitz did not allow workers to change their
fixed shifts after the announcement of the ex-
periment or during the experiment. The increase
in the supply of shifts is fully borne by the
sign-up shifts. Therefore, our experiment could
not induce any kind of selection effect with
regard to the fixed shifts and the revenue change
during the fixed shifts identifies the impact of
the treatment on effort per shift.16
In Figure 1A, we show the log of revenue per
shift in group A and group B during the four
weeks prior to the experiment and in the two
treatment periods. We control for person effects
in Figure 1B by showing the deviation from
person-specific means. If we control for person-
specific effects, we find that both groups gener-
ated almost identical revenues per shift during
the four weeks prior to the experiment. During
the first treatment period, however, group B,
which receives the lower wage, generates
roughly 5 percent more revenue per shift than
group A. Likewise, in the second treatment pe-
riod, group A, which now receives the lower
wage, exhibits roughly a 6-percent-higher rev-
enue per shift than group B. Thus, Figure 1 sug-
gests that the wage increase caused a reduction
in revenue per shift.
The impression conveyed by Figure 1 is further
supported by the two regressions presented in
Table 5, which are based on observations from
group A and group B during fixed shifts. The
dependent variable is log revenue of messenger i
at day t. We include a treatment dummy in both
regressions that takes on a value of one if mes-
16 We should, however, mention that the results remain
the same when we examine revenue per shift over all (fixed
and sign-up) shifts.
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senger i at day t is in the treatment group, and we
further control for daily fixed effects and i’s ten-
ure. Daily fixed effects are important because of
demand variations across days; tenure is important
because experienced messengers usually have
higher productivity. We do not control for indi-
vidual fixed effects in regression (1), but for a
messenger’s gender. This regression shows that
the wage increase leads to a reduction in reve-
nue per shift of roughly 6 percent. We control
for individual fixed effects in regression (2).
The treatment effect in this regression is virtu-
ally unchanged and indicates a reduction in
revenues of roughly 6 percent.
Thus, the temporary wage increase indeed
reduced revenue per shift. The implied wage
elasticity of revenue per shift is 0.06/0.25 
0.24, which is consistent with our neoclassi-
cal model with preference spillovers across pe-
riods and the target income model based on loss
aversion. It is also worthwhile to point out that
this estimate neatly fills the gap between the
elasticity of total revenue and the elasticity of
shifts. The intermediate value (between the
lower and the upper bound) of the elasticity of
total revenue is 1.18. The intermediate value for
the elasticity of shifts is 1.42. Thus, according
to this difference, the elasticity of effort per
shift should be 0.24. Our estimates in Table
5 precisely match this value.
D. Does Loss Aversion Explain the Negative
Impact on Effort per Shift?
In this section, we provide additional evi-
dence that helps us understand the forces be-
hind the negative impact of the wage increase
on effort per shift. Our strategy is to measure
individual-level loss aversion and to examine
whether these measures have predictive value
with regard to individuals’ response of effort
per shift. In other words, we ask the question
 A. Log of daily revenues
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period 1
Treatment
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0
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FIGURE 1. LOG OF DAILY REVENUES ON FIXED SHIFTS
Note: Error bars are standard errors of means.
TABLE 5—THE IMPACT OF THE EXPERIMENT
ON LOG REVENUES PER DAY
(Dependent variable: log (revenues per shift)
during fixed shifts, OLS regressions)
(1) (2)
Treatment dummy 0.0642** 0.0601**
(0.030) (0.030)
Gender (female  1) 0.0545
(0.052)
Log(tenure) 0.105*** 0.015
(0.016) (0.062)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects No Yes
R-Squared 0.149 0.258
N 1,137 1,137
Note: Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on
messengers, are in parentheses.
*** Indicates significance at the 1-percent level.
** Indicates significance at the 5-percent level.
* Indicates significance at the 10-percent level.
Source: Own calculations.
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whether the loss-averse messengers drive the
negative effect of the wage increase on effort
per shift or whether the messengers who are
not loss averse drive this effect. If mainly the
loss-averse messengers show a negative effort
response, the loss-aversion model is sup-
ported. If the negative effect on effort is not
related to individuals’ loss aversion, the neo-
classical model provides the more plausible
explanation.
Loss aversion and reference dependent
behavior have implications in a variety of do-
mains. Loss-averse choices have been docu-
mented, in particular, in the realm of decision
making under uncertainty (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979). Therefore, we measured the
messengers’ loss aversion by observing choices
under uncertainty in an experiment that took
place eight months after the experimental wage
increase. As part of this study, we presented the
messengers with the opportunity to participate
in the following two lotteries:
Lottery A: Win CHF 8 with probability 1⁄2 , lose
CHF 5 with probability 1⁄2 . If subjects
reject lottery A they receive CHF 0.
Lottery B: This lottery consists of six indepen-
dent repetitions of lottery A. If sub-
jects reject lottery B they receive
CHF 0.
Subjects could participate in both lotteries, or
only in one lottery, or they could reject both
lotteries.
These lotteries enable us to construct individ-
ual measures of loss aversion. In particular, the
observed behavior in these lotteries enables us
to classify subjects with regard to their degree
of loss aversion 
. If subjects’ preferences are
given by (7), subjects who reject lottery A have
a higher level of 
 than subjects who accept
lottery A, and subjects who reject lottery A and
B have a higher level of 
 than subjects who
reject only lottery A. In addition, if subjects’
loss aversion is consistent across the two lotter-
ies, then any individual who rejects lottery B
should also reject lottery A because a rejection
of lottery B implies a higher level of loss aver-
sion than a rejection of only lottery A. We
derive these implications of (7) explicitly in
Appendix A.
Among the 42 messengers who belong to
either group A or group B, 19 messengers re-
jected both lotteries, 8 messengers rejected only
lottery A, 1 messenger rejected only lottery B,
and 14 messengers accepted both lotteries.
Thus, with the exception of the one messenger
who rejects only lottery B, all messengers who
rejected lottery B also rejected lottery A. These
results can be neatly captured by a simple loss-
averse utility function that obeys equation (7).17
In principle, one might think that the rejec-
tion of A and/or B is also compatible with risk
aversion arising from diminishing marginal util-
ity of lifetime income. Matthew Rabin’s cali-
bration theorem (Rabin 2000) rules out this
interpretation, however. Rabin showed that a
theory of risk-averse behavior based on the as-
sumption of diminishing marginal utility of life-
time income implies that people essentially
must be risk neutral for low-stake gambles like
our lotteries. Intuitively, this follows from the
fact that risk-averse behavior for low-stake
gambles implies ridiculously high levels of risk
aversion for slightly higher, but still moderate,
stake levels. Yet, such unreasonably high levels
of risk aversion can be safely ruled out. For
example, we show in Appendix B that if one
assumes that the rejection of lottery A is driven
by diminishing marginal utility of lifetime in-
come, then the subject will also reject a lottery
where one can lose $32 with probability 1⁄2 and
win any positive prize with probability 1⁄2 .
Thus, there is no finite prize that induces this
subject to accept a 50-percent chance of losing
$32. Similar results are implied by a rejection of
lottery B.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the behavior of
messengers with and without loss-averse pref-
erences. The figure controls for person-specific
effects by comparing individual log revenues to
the mean of the individual’s log revenues. We
show that the messengers who did not display
loss-averse preferences do not change their ef-
fort per shift across the treatment and the con-
trol period. The messengers who displayed loss
aversion in the lottery choices, however, exhibit
a lower effort per shift in the treatment period
17 These results are qualitatively similar to the results ob-
tained in a many other studies (e.g., Daniel Read, George
Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin 1999; Robin Cubbit, Chris
Starmer, and Robert Sugden 1998; Robin Hogarth and Hillel
Einhorn 1992; Gideon Keren and Willem Wagenaar 1987).
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compared to the control period. This pattern
suggests that the negative effect of wages on
effort per shift may be driven solely by the
loss-averse messengers.
To examine this possibility in more depth, we
ran the regressions in Table 6. In these regres-
sions, log daily revenue of messenger i at day t
is again the dependent variable and we control
for messenger fixed effects in all regressions, as
loss-averse messengers may differ in more than
one dimension from other messengers. In the
first regression, we split the treatment group
according to behavior in lottery A. If a messen-
ger rejects lottery A, the messenger is more loss
averse than if lottery A is accepted. In regres-
sion (1), we estimate the treatment effect sepa-
rately for loss-averse messengers (who rejected
lottery A) and messengers who did not display
loss aversion (who accepted lottery A). The
results show that loss-averse messengers gener-
ated roughly 10-percent lower revenue per shift
when they received the high wage. In contrast,
the treatment effect is much lower and insignif-
icant for the messengers without loss aversion.
Regression (2) of Table 6 provides a robust-
ness check for this result because we use a finer
scale of messengers’ loss aversion which yields
treatment effects for three separate groups: mes-
sengers accepting both lotteries (labeled “not
loss averse”), messengers rejecting one of the
two lotteries, and messengers rejecting both lot-
teries. The theory predicts that the strongest
treatment effect should occur for the group that
rejects both lotteries, followed by the group that
rejects only one lottery. We do find evidence of
this, although the differences between those
who reject both and those who reject only one
lottery are small. Regression (2) also shows that
the wage increase triggers no significantly
negative impact on messengers who exhibit
no loss aversion in the lotteries, while the
other two groups exhibit clear reductions in
revenues during the wage increase. These re-
sults suggest that the negative impact of the
wage increase on revenue per shift is associ-
ated with the messengers’ degree of loss aver-
sion, lending support to the target income
model discussed in Section IIC.
V. Summary
This paper reports the results of a randomized
field experiment examining how workers, who
can freely choose their working time, and their
effort during working time, respond to a fully
anticipated temporary wage increase. We find a
strong positive impact of the wage increase on
TABLE 6—DOES LOSS AVERSION EXPLAIN
THE TREATMENT EFFECT?
(Dependent variable: log (revenues per shift)
during fixed shifts, OLS regressions)
(1) (2)
Treatment effect 
 not
loss averse
0.0273 0.027
(0.033) (0.032)
Treatment effect 
 rejects
lottery A
0.105**
(0.046)
Treatment effect 
 rejects
one lottery
0.0853*
(0.062)
Treatment effect 
 rejects
both lotteries
0.12**
(0.053)
Log(tenure) 0.00152 0.0074
(0.061) (0.060)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.243 0.26
N 1137 1137
Note: Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on
messengers, are in parentheses.
*** Indicates significance at the 1-percent level.
** Indicates significance at the 5-percent level.
* Indicates significance at the 10-percent level.
Source: Own calculations.
Deviation of log(daily revenues) from 
individual means of log(daily revenues)
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FIGURE 2. THE BEHAVIOR OF LOSS-AVERSE AND NOT-
LOSS-AVERSE SUBJECTS DURING CONTROL AND TREATMENT
PERIOD IN FIXED SHIFTS
Note: Error bars are standard errors of means.
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total labor supply during the two four-week
periods in which the experiment took place. The
associated intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion is between 1.12 and 1.25. The large in-
crease in total labor supply is exclusively driven
by the increase in the number of shifts worked.
On average, messengers increase their working
time during the four weeks in which they re-
ceive a higher wage by four shifts (20 hours),
which implies a wage elasticity of shifts be-
tween 1.34 and 1.50. This is a considerably
larger elasticity than what has previously been
found on the basis of daily labor supply data
(Camerer et al. 1997; Chou 2002; Oettinger
1999). We also find that the wage increase
causes a decrease in revenue (effort) per shift by
roughly 6 percent. The increase in the number
of shifts, however, dominates the negative im-
pact on effort per shift by a large margin such
that overall labor supply strongly increases.
The standard neoclassical model with separable
intertemporal utility is not consistent with the ev-
idence because this model predicts that both the
number of shifts and the effort per shift increase in
response to the wage increase. We show, how-
ever, that a neoclassical model with preference
spillovers across periods as well as a target income
model with loss-averse preferences are consistent
with the observed decrease in effort per shift. In
order to discriminate between these two models,
we measured the messengers’ loss aversion at the
individual level in the domain of choices under
uncertainty. We use these measures to examine
whether the negative impact of the wage increase
on effort per shift is mediated by the degree to
which messengers’ are loss averse. We find that
the degree of loss aversion is indeed related to the
response of effort per shift. Higher degrees of loss
aversion are associated with a stronger negative
impact of the wage increase on effort per shift, and
workers who do not display loss aversion in
choices under uncertainty also do not show a
significant effort reduction. Thus, it seems that
loss aversion drives the negative effect of wages
on effort.
We believe that these results contribute to a
deeper understanding of the behavioral founda-
tions of labor supply. Our results do not rule out a
role for “neoclassical” preferences in labor supply
decisions. One-third of the workers in our sample
did not exhibit loss aversion, and the large inter-
temporal substitution effects on overall labor sup-
ply and the supply of shifts document the power of
behavioral forces that have always been empha-
sized in the standard life-cycle model. Our results
also contrast sharply with the small and insignif-
icant substitution effects that have been found in
many previous studies. Therefore, the small ef-
fects in these studies may reflect the constraints
workers face in their labor supply decisions
and—in view of our results—may be less likely
due to workers’ unwillingness to substitute labor
hours over time. Our results on the behavioral
sources of the negative wage elasticity of effort
per shift also suggest, however, that disregarding
reference dependent preferences in effort deci-
sions is not wise.
APPENDIX A
In this appendix, we derive the condi-
tions under which a loss-averse individual,
whose preferences obey (7) in the text, will
reject lotteries A and B. For the purpose of
lottery choices, the disutility of effort does
not matter so that we can simplify preferences
to
vx  r  (x  r) if x	 r
(x r) if x r ,
where x is the lottery outcome and r is the
reference point. We take the reference point to
be the status quo. The individual will reject
gamble A if
0.5v5 0.5v 8 v 0,
which simplifies to
0.55
 0.58  0.
This condition is satisfied if

 	
8
5 .
The individual will reject gamble B if
1
64 v 30
6
64 v 17
15
64 v 4
20
64 v 9

15
64 v 22
6
64 v 35
1
64 v 48 v 0.
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Plugging in our functional form and simplify-
ing, we find that the individual will reject the
gamble if

 	
793
192 .
As claimed in the text, the degree of loss
aversion required to reject gamble B is greater
than the degree of loss aversion needed to
reject A.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix, we prove the following: If
an individual has a concave utility function u( )
and rejects a coin flip, where she can either win
CHF 8 or lose CHF 5, for all wealth levels (m,
), then she will reject any coin flip in which
she could lose CHF 32 no matter how large the
positive prize that is associated with the coin
flip.
PROOF:
We proceed in four steps:
(i) We adopt the convention that, if indiffer-
ent, the individual rejects the coin flip.
Rejecting the coin flip implies
0.5um  8  0.5um  5  um
N um 8 um um um 5.
It follows from concavity that 8[u(m 
8)  u(m  7)]  u(m  8)  u(m) and
u(m)  u(m  5)  5[u(m  4)  u(m 
5)]. Define MU(x)  u(x)  u(x  1) as
the marginal utility of the xth dollar. Put-
ting the last three inequalities together, we
obtain
MUm  8 
5
8 MUm  5
and, because of the premise, it is true that
MU(x  12)  58 MU(x) for all x  m  4.
(ii) We now derive an upper bound on u().
The concavity of u( ) implies
um  12  um  12MUm.
Using the same logic,
um  24  um  12MUm
 12MUm  12
 um  12MUm1  58
um  36  um
 12MUm1  58  58
2
and so on. Thus, we can develop a geo-
metric series starting from m. Taking the
limit, we obtain
u  um  12MU
8
3
 um  32MUm.
(iii) Concavity implies u(m  32)  u(m) 
32MU(m).
(iv) Using the results from steps (ii) and (iii),
we get an upper bound on the value of a
coin flip where the individual would either
lose CHF 32 or win an infinite amount:
0.5um  32  0.5u  um.
This implies that the individual would
reject the gamble.
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